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NATURAL INDIVIDUALS AND INTRINSIC PROPERTIES 
GODEHARD BRÜNTRUP 
Abstract 
In the world there are concrete particulars that exhibit the kind of substantial unity that allows them to be 
called substances or “natural individuals”, as opposed to artifacts or mere conglomerates. Persons, animals,  
and possibly the most fundamental physical simples are all natural individuals. What gives these entities the  
ontological  status  of  a  substantial  unity?  Arguments  from the  philosophy of  mind and arguments  from 
general metaphysics show that physical properties alone cannot account for substantial unity. The ultimate  
intrinsic properties of natural individuals resemble phenomenal mental properties rather than any other kind 
of  known  properties.  Pan(proto-)psychism is  thus  supported  by  systematically  related  arguments  from 
different  areas  of  philosophical  inquiry.  A certain  amount  of  skepticism  regarding  the  full  nature  of  
absolutely intrinsic properties is nevertheless well-advised. 
1. Introduction 
In recent analytic philosophy, a substance has mainly been conceived as that which endures through 
time.  The  debate  between  endurantists  and perdurantists  became thus  the  centerpiece  of  many 
discussions.  There  is,  however,  another  historically  quite  influential  aspect  of  substantiality.  A 
substance is something that exists (or possibly can exist) by itself. Substances are ontologically self-
sufficient;  they  do  have  an  intrinsic  nature  that  is  not  bestowed  on  them by entering  certain 
accidental relations. This notion of a substance would encompass also very short-lived and event-
like entities. If they are part of the ontological array of concrete entities, they are also substances in 
this sense. Because the notion of a substance is heavily loaded with preconceptions, I choose to call 
them “natural individuals.” They are “natural” because they are to be distinguished from artifacts 
like computers or TV sets. They are individuals because they are to be distinguished from mere 
conglomerates, like a pile of stones or a cloud formation. I wish to argue that there is a substantive 
theoretical link between the discussion about the intrinsic natures of natural individuals and some 
developments in the philosophy of mind. 
In recent philosophy of mind, the discussion of the “hard problem of consciousness” has resulted in 
a  widespread  acceptance  of  the  thesis  that  the  qualitative  mental  properties  of  phenomenal 
experience cannot be fully reduced to physical properties. It is the intrinsic qualitative aspect of the 
mental  that  cannot  be captured by the causal  and functional  concepts  of  the physical  sciences. 
Because of their intrinsic nature, qualitative mental states cannot be captured by scientific analysis. 
The  properties  that  science  finds  are  all  dispositional.  Dispositions  require  a  categorical  (non-
dispositional)  basis  on  which  they  supervene.  For  present  purposes  I  will  mean  by  “intrinsic 
properties” those properties that a thing has in itself, independently of its relations to other things: 
the properties it could have even if it were the only thing in the universe. The mental properties of 
the Cartesian thinking thing are intrinsic in this sense. It can be conceived that all of its mental  
states could exist even without a material external world. The richness of its intrinsic properties is in 
principle  independent  of  external  relations  (maybe  with  the  exception  of  God).  Thus,  in 
contemporary philosophy of mind, functionalism has been criticized as capturing only the relational 
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aspects of mind, and missing the intrinsic, qualitative mental properties. Can physical properties be 
intrinsic in this sense? That is a difficult question. Mass is by some considered to be an intrinsic 
property. But then, having a mass of m is a property such that something that has that property will 
play a certain functional role defined by a relation of force and acceleration: m=F/ a. What about 
rest  mass?  It  is  a consequence of general  relativity that  only an isolated system would have a 
coordinate-independent  mass.  Since  a  non-isolated  system  is  constantly  exchanging  energy-
momentum  with  its  environment,  the  mass  at  a  certain  point  in  time  would  depend  on  the 
simultaneity determinations of the observer. In quantum mechanics mass is ultimately explained by 
the Higgs mechanism, which clearly is a functional concept. It seems that, if only we dig deep 
enough, even physical concepts that looked prima facie like non-relational intrinsic properties, turn 
out to be defined relationally. It is thus reasonable to ask: What is the intrinsic categorical nature of 
those entities that are relationally defined by physics? 
A similar question was asked in early modern philosophy about the intelligibility of the Cartesian 
notion of a material substance as an extended thing. The main argument here is that extension is a 
relation which cannot on its own constitute a substance. It presupposes some intrinsic nature of the 
relata, the terms of the relation. A system of spatial relationships is too incomplete to constitute 
areal concrete entity. More recently, Max Newman (Newman 1928) argued against Russell's view 
that we know only the structural features of the world. He claimed that, unless we take into account 
the  intrinsic  features  of  the  relata,  there  will  be  too  many relations.  The existence  of  a  set  of 
relations  is  trivially  true  of  a  set  of  objects  unless  the  relata  have  some  qualitative  intrinsic 
properties. Mere relations are just sets of ordered sequences of entities. And there are too many of 
them for any given number of objects, unless the intrinsic nature of those objects  determines a 
specific relational structure. Newman reads this as a reductio against relationalism, claiming that a 
relationalist view of the world lacks any substantive ontological content except for a trivial claim 
about the cardinality of individuals in this world. One can also read this idea more in the line of 
Putnam's  “model-theoretic  argument”  (Putnam  1980).  There  are  too  many  ontological 
interpretations (models) of our theories. Our scientific descriptions of the world are unable to single 
out the intended model, i.e., the real world. Similarly, if objects are mere nodes in a relational graph 
with no intrinsic nature, then too many relational graphs are possible. Since science deals only with 
the relational structure, not the intrinsic natures, we can never know the one true story about the 
world in a metaphysical-realist way. We have too many “truths.” 
It seems that what is missing in the merely relational definition of a physical entity is some intrinsic  
qualitative aspect that grounds and determines the relations. Possible candidates for such grounding 
intrinsic properties are (proto-)mental or (proto-)experiential properties. If that is the case, then a 
realistic physicalism or naturalism entails panpsychism, as has been recently argued by authors like 
David Chalmers, Galen Strawson and Gregg Rosenberg. 
2. Intrinsic properties and the philosophy of mind 
Many arguments have been advanced to show that facts about qualia are not implied by physical  
facts. The most famous being the one about Mary the perfect neuroscientist who has never seen a 
color. Initially, I will focus here on David Chalmers' famous “zombie argument” because it helps to 
clearly  indicate  where  in  the  logical  structure  of  the  debate  the  physicalist  is  forced  to  draw 
panpsychist conclusions. The general form of the argument is this (Chalmers 2002, 249): Let P be 
the  conjunction  of  all  micro-physical  truths  about  the  universe,  and  let  Q  be  an  arbitrary 
phenomenal truth about the universe.
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(1) P&~Q is conceivable. 
(2) If P&~Q is conceivable, P&~Q is metaphysically possible. 
(3) If P&~Q is metaphysically possible, materialism is false. 
(4) Materialism is false. 
But, says the standard scientific essentialist (type-B materialist), P&~Q is only conceivable but not 
metaphysically possible. The mistake, according to the type-B materialist, is that we are working 
with  primary  intensions  when  dealing  with  epistemic  possibility  (conceivability),  and  with 
secondary intensions when dealing with metaphysical possibility. In the first case, we consider a 
world as actual; in the latter case we consider a world as counterfactual (how things might have 
been but are not). If we consider Putnam's XYZ-world as actual, then “water is not H2O” is true. 
This is an instance of an epistemic possibility. If we rigidly hold the meaning of “water” fixed by 
the actual world and counterfactually consider the XYZ-world, then “water is not H2O” turns out to 
be  false.  Then  “water  is  H2O”  expresses  a  Kripkean  necessary  truth.  Let  us  call  possibility 
associated  with  primary  intensions  “l-possibility,”  and  possibility  associated  with  secondary 
intensions  “2-possibility.”  In  order  for  Chalmers'  argument  to  meet  the  challenge  of  type  B-
materialism, it should rather look like this (Chalmers 2009): 
(1) P&~Q is conceivable. 
(2) If P&~Q is conceivable, P&~Q is 1-possible.
(3) If P&~Q is 1-possible, P&~Q is 2-possible.
(4) If P&~Q is 2-possible, materialism is false.
(5) Materialism is false.
Here,  the  truth  of  (3)  requires  that  both  P and Q have primary and secondary intensions  that 
coincide. In the case of Q, this seems unproblematic. If something feels like pain, it  is pain. If 
something feels like consciousness, it is consciousness. In the case of P, however, the issue becomes 
much more problematic. Physical properties are functionally defined. We can say that the primary 
intension of “mass” picks out whatever plays the mass role in a given world. We can also say that  
the secondary intension of “mass” is tied to the property playing that role in our world in such a 
way that in a world where something else plays the mass role, this role filler is not mass. Premise 
(3) can be rejected on these grounds. But what does that mean? In that case there would be possible  
worlds that verify the structural-relational description of our world in physical terms without being 
an  exact  duplicate  of  our  world.  The  physical  structure  of  those  other  worlds  would  be 
indistinguishable  from  our  world,  but  the  intrinsic  natures  carrying  those  relations  would  be 
different. The most interesting case would be worlds verifying P&~Q. This leads to an interesting 
metaphysical picture: the relational-structural properties of physics in our world do not necessitate 
the  Q-properties  (phenomenal  properties),  the  Q-properties  do  not  supervene  logically  on  the 
relational-structural  properties.  However,  the  relational-structural  properties  of  physics  together 
with additional intrinsic properties necessitate the emergence of phenomenal consciousness. This 
metaphysical picture has been eloquently expressed by Astronomer Sir Arthur Eddington in his 
work  Space,  Time,  and  Gravitation:  “Physics  is  the  knowledge  of  structural  form,  and  not 
knowledge of content. All through the physical world runs that unknown content, which must surely 
be the stuff of our consciousness” (Eddington 1920, 200). Russell's “neutral monism” was based on 
similar intuitions: “As regards the world in general, both physical and mental, everything we know 
of its intrinsic character is derived from the mental side, and almost everything we know of its 
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causal  laws  is  derived  from the  physical  side”  (Russell  1927,402).  The structure  of  Chalmers' 
argument thus comes finally down to this: 
(1) P&~Q is conceivable. 
(2) IfP&~Q is conceivable, then P&~Q is 1-possible. 
(3) If P&~Q is 1-possible, then P&~Q is 2-possible or Russellian monism is true. 
(4) If P&~Q is 2-possible, materialism is false. 
(5) Materialism is false or Russellian monism is true.
In the end, Chalmers thinks that traditional physicalism fails because he rejects the idea of a brute 
and  inexplicable  emergence  of  the  mental  from the  physical.  Only  if  there  are  (proto-)mental 
properties (intrinsic), nomologically connected to the physical properties (relational) by irreducible 
emergence laws, can the emergence of consciousness be necessitated in such a way that is no longer 
mysterious. Galen Strawson has in recent years developed a metaphysical theory based on a similar 
intuition. He calls it “realistic monism” or “real physicalism” (Strawson 2006). It is based on a 
venerable  argument  for  panpsychism,  the  “genetic  argument.”  It  rests  on  a  claim  about  the 
intelligibility of radical inter-attribute emergence, as opposed to weaker intra-attribute emergence. It 
mirrors the traditional distinction between a strong inter-actionist substance dualism and a weaker 
intra-actionist dual-aspect theory or property dualism. In his  paper, “Panpsychism” Thomas Nagel 
had  argued  that  uniform psycho-physical  correlations  could  not  account  for  the  emergence  of 
mental properties from the physical components of a system: “Instead, intrinsic properties of the 
components must be discovered from which the mental properties of the system follow necessarily. 
This may be unattainable, but if mental phenomena have a causal explanation such properties must 
exist, and they will not be physical” (Nagel 1979, 187). Emergence cannot be brute in the sense of 
there being nothing in the emergence base in virtue of which the emergent phenomenon emerges: ex 
nihilo nihil fit. Nothing can give what it does not possess. In order to make sense of the emergence 
of consciousness, the evolution of the phenomenal mind must be smooth. Consciousness in some 
form must be present “at the very origin of things” (James 1890, 149). Inter-attribute emergence is 
to  be  avoided.  Otherwise  even  a  Cartesian  soul  could  mysteriously  emerge  from a  Cartesian 
physical body. One might as well try to “imagine” the emergence of a concrete physical object from 
a configuration of abstract mathematical objects. If such inter-attribute emergence is considered 
intelligible, then one will inevitably end up with a radical Humean view of causal powers in which 
“any thing may produce any thing” (Treatise, III, xv), and any reasonable prospect for a substantive 
metaphysical account of the mind-body relation will have vanished. If emergence is construed as an 
intra-attribute relation, however, then one has to give up the standard physicalist principle that there 
are  no  (proto-)mental  properties  at  the  ontological  base  levels.  Strawson  calls  this  dogma  of 
contemporary physicalism the “NE principle”: “physical stuff is, in itself, in its fundamental nature, 
something wholly and utterly non-experiential” (Strawson 2006, 11). The intuition that a system 
that  is  only structurally defined cannot  give rise  to  qualitative experience is  more than just  an 
epistemic problem of cognitive upward opacity that might be overcome by more empirical research; 
it  is  a  deep metaphysical  puzzle.  One of  the  best  ways  to  present  this  lack  of  analysis  is  the  
“argument  from  cellular  automata”  by  Gregg  Rosenberg  (Rosenberg  2004,  14-30).  Cellular 
automata are artificial digital  worlds consisting of basic particulars called “cells” in an abstract 
space. These cells have relational properties connecting them to other cells. Computer modelers 
define various worlds by giving the cells different properties and then study their dynamics through 
consecutive  computational  steps.  This  is  usually  done  by defining  rules  that  determine  which 
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properties a cell will have at a given time as a function of which properties the neighboring cells 
had at an immediately preceding time. In simple versions of cellular automata the basic particulars 
have only simple properties like “on” and “off.” One can build on these humble beginnings and 
construct more complicated cellular automata that may ultimately mimic physical properties like 
spin,  charge  or  mass.  The fascinating  fact  is  that  despite  its  rather  simple  physics  the  cellular  
automaton is enormously versatile, in fact a universal Turing machine. Very quickly individual cells 
join together to build more and more complex structures and patterns that are sustained over many 
steps of computation. The machine seemingly produces endurants (stable relational patterns) which 
arise  out  of  a  sequence  of  event-like  occurrents  (discrete  computational  states  of  the  system). 
Quickly these patterns become quite sophisticated, featuring a kind of non-trivial self-replication 
that is functionally similar to certain structures of living beings, like DNA. For this reason cellular  
automata are sometimes called “life worlds.” The basic facts of cellular automata, the distribution of 
properties over the grid of cells, necessitate the higher-level structural facts about stable emerging 
patterns.  There  is  no  mysterious  inter-attribute  emergence  involved,  even though the  emerging 
patterns exhibit new properties that cannot be attributed to individual cells. Everything happens 
within one strictly delineated ontological scheme. Standard physicalism assumes that our world is 
an extremely complex cellular automaton. Thus the following problem arises:
(1) The fundamental facts of cellular automata are defined entirely by the dynamic relations of 
the cells. 
(2) Facts of phenomenal consciousness are intrinsic qualitative facts, which cannot be entirely 
defined by the dynamic relations in which they enter. 
(3) Facts about dynamic relations do not entail (a priori or a posteriori) intrinsic qualitative facts 
about phenomenal experience. 
(4) Thus, the intrinsic qualitative facts about phenomenal experience are not entailed in the facts 
about cellular automata.
The question is then: if our world is a cellular automaton, how does the phenomenal mind emerge? 
This  is  exactly  the  problem raised  by  the  “genetic  argument”  for  panpsychism.  To  avoid  this 
notoriously hard problem, one can resort to the denial of the existence of phenomenal experience 
and become an eliminativist about the phenomenal mind. Strawson is quite outspoken about this 
strategy: “This particular denial is the strangest thing that has ever happened in the history of human 
thought, not just the whole history of philosophy. It falls, unfortunately, to philosophy, not religion, 
to reveal the deepest woo-woo of the human mind” (Strawson 2006, 6). It seems more reasonable to 
assume that the functional-relational picture of the world assumed in the model of cellular automata 
is  somehow incomplete.  This  was indeed Russell's  intuition.  Maybe we are missing something 
about the intrinsic nature of the physical world in  virtue of which (plus the relevant  laws) the 
emergence  of  conscious  mind can  be explained.  This  is,  of  course,  just  a  conjecture,  but  it  is 
certainly a possibility that knowledge of the intrinsic properties of matter would help to overcome 
the puzzle of inter-attribute emergence. In Russell's words: “The physical world is only known as 
regards  certain  abstract  features  of  its  space-time  structure  –  features  which,  because  of  their 
abstractness, do not suffice to show whether the world is, or is not, different in intrinsic character 
from the world of mind” (Russell 1948, 240). To use Whitehead's term, the modern notion of matter 
presents  us  with  “vacuous”  entities  whose  intrinsic  nature  is  unknown.  Inspired  by  Humean 
arguments, Peter Unger has recently presented a visually compelling picture of this problem. Let us 
define two worlds in purely structural terms, not assuming any intrinsic qualitative properties. The 
5 von 12
IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version:
Honnefelder, Ludger / Runggaldier, Edmund / Schick, Benedikt (eds.)
Unity and Time as Problems in Metaphysics. Berlin/New York: 2009, 237-252.
first world is a classical Newtonian world of particles moving about in empty space according to the 
laws of physics. Call this the “particulate world.” In the second world there is a continuous material 
plenum (a continuous field of matter) in which there are little perfectly empty spaces, or absolute 
vacua, or simply “bubbles.” Call this the “plenumate world.” Now let us assume that the two worlds 
stand in an isomorphic relation in such a way that for each particle in the particulate world there is a  
corresponding bubble in the plenumate world (in the same location, governed by the same laws). It 
is Unger's  contention that these two worlds are functionally equivalent (Unger 2006, 21-31). A 
functional-relational  description  would  be  unable  to  capture  the  differences  between  these  two 
worlds. To put it in different terms: If we were to construct cellular automata to model these worlds,  
only  one  would  be  needed  to  model  both.  Maybe  this  picture  relies  too  much  on  visual 
imaginability,  but  it  nevertheless  captures  the  intuition  that  the  abstractness  of  the  relational 
structure  really  “abstracts  away”  from  something  that  needs  to  be  added  to  complete  the 
metaphysical picture. The genetic argument for panpsychism claims that we have good reason to 
believe  that  this  “something,”  which  is  being  abstracted  away  from,  better  be  something 
(proto-)mental, since otherwise the emergence of the phenomenal mind remains mysterious. But the 
problem of  emergence  is  not  the  only reason that  could  motivate  a  critique  of  the  functional-
relational picture. A similar line of argument was developed long before contemporary philosophy 
of mind. Modern philosophy was quite critical of Descartes' notion of a material substance, a notion 
that still governs the scientific world-view to this day. 
3. Intrinsic properties and the metaphysics of natural individuals 
The metaphysical question is whether something as abstract as a formal system of spatio-temporal 
relations is sufficient to account for the concrete substantiality or thinghood of a natural individual. 
A structure must be a structure of something. Robert Adams recently presented a line of thought 
similar to Unger's. He claims that we cannot imagine a shape without some chromatic property. The 
formal entity needs a “filling.” And from there he goes on to argue: “We may conjecture that the 
reality of a substance must include something intrinsic and qualitative over and above any formal or 
structural features it may possess” (Adams 2007, 40). But early modern thought had expelled all 
qualitative, non-structural qualities from material bodies and had placed them entirely inside the 
mind. A view that Whitehead has characterized brilliantly: “The poets are entirely mistaken. They 
should address their lyrics to themselves, and should turn them into odes of self-congratulation on 
the excellency of the human mind. Nature is a dull affair, soundless, scentless, colourless; merely 
the  hurrying  of  material,  endlessly,  meaninglessly”  (Whitehead  1925,  80).  Assuming  a  “real 
physicalism” (in the sense of Strawson) we cannot take refuge in Cartesian dualism or mysterious 
emergence.  Human  persons  are  natural  individuals  and  material  objects.  But  if  it  is  from the 
experiential qualities that human persons derive their positive non-formal content as substances, 
could we then not reasonably ask if humans are but one special case of natural individuals and that  
natural substances as such require such positive content. We would thus be siding with Whitehead 
in claiming that some sort of qualitative intrinsic content is constitutive of nature at large. A quick 
survey of some topics in early modern philosophy will prove helpful in exploring this issue. 
In  a  brilliant  piece of  skeptical  reasoning,  Hume challenges  the notion  of  a  Cartesian material 
substance.  He claims that  upon the removal  of sensible qualities from the rank of independent 
existences,  we are  merely reduced to  primary qualities  like  figure,  motion  and cohesion.  This 
process, instead of aiding in explaining the operations of external objects, utterly annihilates all 
these objects, resulting in the most extravagant skepticism concerning them. And he goes on: “If 
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colours, sounds, tastes, and smells be merely perceptions, nothing we can conceive is possest of a 
real, continued, and independent existence; not even motion, extension and solidity, which are the 
primary qualities chiefly insisted on” (Hume 1739, IV, iv, 512f.). 
Indeed, Descartes claims that spatial extension is the essence of corporeal substance, and nothing 
else contributes to it. For Descartes the very nature of a substance is determined by its attributes. He 
does not construe substances as mere substrata or bare this-ness.  He argues that the distinction 
between the notion of a substance and its  attributes  is  merely a distinction of reason not  areal 
distinction: “For there is some difficulty in separating the notion of substance from the notions of 
thought or extension, which of course differ from substance only in the reason” (Principles 1.63). A 
material Cartesian substance is thus nothing but modes of extension, i.e., shape, size, and motion in 
space. The key question for our present purposes is whether or not this notion of a substance as 
mere extension is ultimately intelligible. What can it mean that there is no real distinction between 
body and spatial extension? It seems that there has to be something that is extended in space, and 
that something cannot again be just space. Here the problem with relationalism resurfaces again. In 
his  critique  of  Descartes'  notion  of  a  material  substance,  Leibniz  argues  that  extension  can  be 
analyzed in merely relational terms; but then the question about the intrinsic nature of the relata 
arises. In a letter to de Volder, Leibniz makes the point that extension cannot be conceived in itself. 
Extension for him, is not a primitive but an analyzable concept; it can be analyzed into plurality, 
continuity, and coexistence or the existence of parts at one and the same time.1 But parts of what? 
As Leibniz argues elsewhere, extension is just a continuous multiplicity of something that is spread 
out.  The  nature  of  the  substance  that  is  being  spread  out  is  not  explicated  by the  concept  of 
extension;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  ontologically  prior  to  the  repetitive  multiplicity  of  extension 
(G IV, 467). Challenging Descartes, Leibniz claims that extension cannot be something absolute, it 
rather  is  something  relative  to  what  is  being  expanded:  “...  extensionem non  esse  absolutum, 
quoddam praedicatum, sed relativum ad id quod extenditur sive diffunditur” (G IV, 394). The key 
intuition  here  is  again  that  extension,  due  to  its  formal-relational  character,  is  too  abstract  to 
constitute  a  concrete  individual  substance  in  the  same way that  neither  multitude  nor  number 
constitute  a  substance,  unless we are ready to specify what  it  is  that  is  repeated or numbered.  
Something ontologically prior must be assumed which is continued or diffused. Leibniz gives these 
intuitive examples: “whiteness in milk, color, ductility and weight in gold, and resistance in matter” 
(to de Volder, IV 1699, G II, 170). An “extended thing on its own” is impossible, it could not even 
be extended. The relational properties of substances must have an underlying foundation of intrinsic 
properties. Famously, Leibniz claimed that there is no denomination so extrinsic that it does not 
have something intrinsic as its foundation (to de Volder, IV 1702, G II, 240). If this is correct, then 
we need ultimate intrinsic properties that carry the entire net of functional-relational properties in 
the world. This intuition resurfaces in contemporary debates. In his paper “Pattern and Being”, John 
Haugeland assumes the traditional view that a substance needs properties which it has regardless of 
anything else. He then considers the ontological status of the pieces in a chess game – say a rook or 
a pawn – and claims that their very nature is determined entirely by how they move about in the  
chess game in relation to other pieces. He then concludes: 
“No rook is a substance .... Nothing about a rook is determinate, not even its 'rookness,' apart from 
1 Leibniz to de Volder, IV 1699, G II, 169f. I owe this quote and some other helpful references to early modern 
philosophy to the unpublished manuscript “Physicalism and Absolutely Intrinsic Properties” by Derek Pereboom. It 
is available online at consciousness.anu.edu.au/papers/pereboom.doc. 
Adams 2007 also provides some illuminating references to Leibniz, Hume, Locke and Kant. 
A new English translation of the Leibniz – de Volder correspondence has been completed by Paul Lodge and will be 
published by Yale University Press (forthcoming 2011).
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its participation in a chess game” (Haugeland 1993, 63). The situation is even more complicated. 
The formal definition of a type in a chess game is circular. The nature of each type is completely 
determined by the set of allowable moves it makes within the game as a whole. The chess game as a 
whole, however, is defined by the interdependent set of types which play functional roles in it. Each 
part  of the game presupposes  the existence of the whole game,  and the game presupposes  the 
existence  of  its  parts.  Why  isn't  this  circularity  of  chess  categories  vicious  (cf.  Rosenberg 
2004, 234)? How can chess games actually and concretely exist? Rosenberg claims that there must 
be something distinct from the formal structure that actually grounds the game in concrete reality. In 
the case of a chess game we have physically distinct objects that serve as stand-ins or realizers of 
the relevant types, thus allowing for the existence of concrete tokens of those types. Of course, there 
is much more to consider here, like the concrete chess board or the physical position of the players 
in space. Without such “carriers” of the formal structure, the game would remain too incomplete 
and abstract to exist concretely. Rosenberg extends this thought to other, more complex, conceptual 
systems  such  as  those  constructed  by  scientific  theories.  They  too  are  abstract  and  circularly 
defined, consider cellular automata in computer science again. Each cell is defined by its role in the 
entire  system,  and  the  entire  system  is  defined  by  the  cells.  Cellular  automata  may  exist  as 
computational systems because there is something external to the formal system that realizes or 
carries it. The physical states of the hardware are the carriers of the cellular automata. Biology as an 
abstract conceptual system is carried by the mechanics of molecular biochemistry, psychology by 
the dynamical properties of the neural system, economics by the needs and desires of individuals. 
The crucial question is however: What carries the most basic physical level? Physics presents us a 
world  of  interdependently defined  functional  roles.  Are  there  any properties  that  can  give  this 
circularly defined conceptual system a foothold in concrete reality? This is a puzzling question. Let 
us call it the “ultimate carrier problem.” It is very similar to the question Leibniz raised with regard 
to  Descartes'  notion  of  matter.  Not  surprisingly,  Rosenberg  makes  a  similar  move.  He  calls 
properties  that  are  functionally  defined  within  a  system  “intrinsic  to  a  system”  (Rosenberg 
2004, 237). In order to avoid an infinite regress of ever more fine-grained systems, where each 
lower structure is serving as the carrier of the next higher one, a stopper is needed. Also, there are 
good scientific reasons to assume that nature has a lower size limit (planck size scale). Only a 
property that is intrinsic tout court and not relative to a system could bring this about and serve as  
an ultimate carrier.  Are there properties that  are  not intrinsic to any system, but at  least  partly 
intrinsic to themselves? The only candidates we know of are phenomenal qualities. One cannot 
understand the nature of phenomenal qualities by knowledge of their contextual relations alone. 
This radical intrinsicness is the very nature of phenomenal qualia. Whatever grounds the structural-
relational properties of the world must have this radical intrinsicness. It might well be that our own 
consciousness is the closest analogue we get to this underlying reality. 
A viable  metaphysical  alternative  seems to  be  radical  relationalism.  Relationalism differs  from 
functionalism exactly by getting rid of all realizers. According to relationalism, there is only the 
relational reality consisting of relations and nodes defined by their place in the overall relational 
system (cf. Dipert 1997). Nature is like a mathematical graph. There are no nonrelational properties. 
But since we know that our own intrinsic qualitative conscious phenomenal states exist, we already 
know that relationalism as a universal metaphysical doctrine cannot be true. There is more to the 
world than relations and point-like relata without intrinsic properties. Combining these two insights 
opens up a rationally well-grounded road to the acceptance of pan(proto-)psychism. This line of 
thought is often characterized as the “argument for panpsychism from intrinsic natures.” It is at this 
point that the arguments for the irreducibility of qualia in the philosophy of mind and arguments for  
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the intrinsic properties of natural individuals from general metaphysics start to point in the same 
direction. 
This insight  may be surprising to contemporary readers,  but was well-known by many modern 
philosophers. For Kant it was obvious that the only absolutely intrinsic properties we can conceive 
of are taken from the mental realm. It is worthwhile to quote him at length: “It is quite otherwise 
with a substantia phaenomenon in space; its inner determinations are nothing but relations, and it 
itself is entirely made up of me re relations. We are acquainted with substance in space only through 
forces which are active in this and that space, either bringing other objects to it (attraction), or 
preventing them from penetrating into it (repulsion and impenetrability). We are not acquainted 
with any other properties constituting the concept of the substance which appears in space and 
which we call matter. As object of pure understanding, on the other hand, every substance must 
have inner determinations and powers which pertain to its inner reality. But what inner accidents 
can I entertain in thought, save only those which my inner sense presents to me? They must be 
something which is either itself a thinking or analogous to thinking” (CPR B321, transl. Norman 
Kemp Smith). 
4. The possibility of pan (proto-)psychism reconsidered 
By “analogous to thinking” Kant probably meant something like protomental properties that are in 
some relevant aspects similar to known mental properties but then also quite different from the 
highly developed mental properties of humans. But how could possibly all relational properties of 
material  objects  be grounded in  intrinsic  properties?  And what  does  “grounding” mean in  this 
context? If grounding means that the intrinsic properties are the constitution base of the relational 
extrinsic properties, then we have a metaphysical system in which certain fundamental entities with 
absolutely intrinsic properties constitute all the remainder of reality – a view, that Leibniz famously 
argued for in his  Monadology. The key was to replace “mutual causal influence” with “mutual 
information” (Seager 2006, 4). The whole of physical space was constructed by giving each monad 
a spatial viewpoint from which space was constituted as experienced space. This seems too daring 
for most, and is considered by many as a position completely at odds with contemporary science. 
The latter claim may not be entirely accurate, however. Physicist David Bohm made a somewhat 
similar claim by introducing the quantum potential in order to provide an ontology for quantum 
mechanics. In the Bohmian interpretation, a single electron (say) passing to the lower slit in the 
two-slit  experiment  receives  information by the quantum potential  about  the state  of  the entire 
system, including whether the upper slit is open or shut. It acts according to this information. Bohm 
talks  about  “active  information”,  thus  introducing  mental  representation  and  mental  causation 
(causally efficacious mental content) at the most basic level of the universe (Bohm 1990). But it 
seems that electron is just mirroring the space around it, using the information presented in the 
quantum potential. Such mirroring would not be enough to actually constitute the spatial relations. 
This could only be the case if by being experienced in a certain way, spatial relations would come to 
exist  in  a  certain  way.  This  idea  is  clearly  more  related  to  another  interpretation  of  quantum 
mechanics – the idea that reality becomes concrete and determined only relative to an experiencing 
observer. Here the experiencing observer becomes, at least partially, constitutive of reality. In his 
Mindful  Universe  Henry Stapp  advances  an  interpretation  of  quantum mechanics  according  to 
which entities are ultimately bipolar – material and mental. The Schrödinger equation describes the 
deterministic and material aspect, the indeterministic collapse relates to the perspectival and mental 
aspect of reality. This mental aspect does not arise miraculously from the material aspect, rather it is 
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a fundamental feature of reality (Stapp 2007). But without doubt, Leibniz' view goes considerably 
further; his idealism grounds all physical objects in mental states of the monads, thus rendering the 
physical world but a “well-founded phenomenon.” 
This idealistic reading of the absolute carrier problem seems unnecessary. It is not required to claim 
that all relational facts are mere phenomena. It would suffice to show that relational properties need 
to be completed and “filled” by absolutely intrinsic properties in order to gain a foothold in concrete 
reality. To distinguish this solution to the problem of ultimate realizers from Leibniz's idealism, one 
should characterize it as a dual aspect theory; the relational properties account for the structural 
form,  but  the  absolutely intrinsic  properties  account  for  the  ultimate  realizers  of  the  relational 
structure. One might even think of some kind of “hylomorphism” of the relational and the intrinsic.  
Both aspects together constitute a concrete natural individual. Thus the relational and the intrinsic 
aspects of reality have basic ontological status, without one having clear priority over the other. 
Alternatively,  a neutral monism can also serve as the metaphysical framework. In this case, the 
basic properties of the world are neither physical nor phenomenal,  but the phenomenal and the 
physical are constructed out of them. “From their intrinsic natures in combination, the phenomenal 
is constructed; and from their extrinsic relations, the physical is constructed” (Chalmers 1996, 156). 
But in any case, this ontology implies that perspectival representation is a fundamental feature of 
the  world.  Each  natural  individual  has  some  representational  perspective  on  the  world.  Mere 
conglomerates do not (as such) have this perspectival unity, only the simples that constitute them 
may  again  be  unified  in  this  way.  The  classic  distinction  between  true  substances  and  mere 
conglomerates can thus be explained in this metaphysical picture. Mental or proto-mental intrinsic 
properties  can  thus  play  an  important  role  in  solving  the  “special  composition  problem”  for 
substances. 
In recent philosophy of mind there has been a discussion whether consciousness is grounded in 
intentionality, or intentionality is grounded in consciousness. Reductive representationalists argue 
that  phenomenal  properties  are  equivalent  to  representational  properties  that  can be completely 
characterized in non-phenomenal terms. If this is true, then built-in representational perspectives 
will not solve the absolute carrier problem because they are again merely structural. In order to 
solve the absolute carrier problem we need carriers that are absolutely intrinsic. Again, the only 
candidates for properties of this kind we know of are phenomenal, experiential mental properties. It 
is this fact which lends substantial support for some kind of panpsychism. 
It was the purpose of this paper to show that this move is not only motivated by non-reductionist 
arguments  in  the  philosophy of  mind  but  equally by the  argument  for  intrinsic  natures  in  the 
metaphysics  of  concrete  particulars.  It  is  this  mutual  support  of  independently  well-motivated 
reasons  that  makes  the  overall  argument  compelling.  This  complex  edifice  of  metaphysical 
assertions does not come without  a price,  however.  Thomas Nagel has famously remarked that 
“panpsychism  has  the  faintly  sickening  odor  of  something  put  together  in  a  metaphysical 
laboratory” (Nagel  1986, 49).  The position is  initially counter-intuitive,  and only as a result  of 
lengthy argumentation is it gaining some plausibility. There are, of course, “simpler” alternatives. 
Assuming so far unknown absolutely intrinsic properties of matter is certainly a possibility. Russell 
sometimes preferred skepticism: “The only legitimate attitude about the physical world seems to be 
one of complete agnosticism as regards all but its mathematical properties” (Russell 1927, 270). 
This  sounds  reasonable  indeed,  and  a  certain  amount  of  skepticism with  regard  to  absolutely 
intrinsic properties is well-advised. But that leaves us with a significant gap in our understanding. 
On the other hand, there remains the intuitive force of the genetic argument: “We ought ... to try 
every possible mode of conceiving of consciousness so that it may not appear equivalent to the 
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irruption into the universe of a new nature non-existent to then” (James 1890, 148). 
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